Despite its strategic importance, or perhaps precisely because of it, French digital sovereignty cannot be summed up by a single definition. At least seven visions coexist within public authorities and the economic world.
It was Bernard Benhamou and Laurent Sorbier who coined the term “digital sovereignty.” In 2006, the two experts warned political decision-makers against American hegemony in Internet governance, “the new ground where economic, military, and political power is now played out.” The concept was successfully adopted by Pierre Bellanger in a popular book.

Twenty years later, digital technology has become one of the major levers of state sovereignty, acquiring at least as much importance “as coal and steel did in their time,” as Philippe Dewost recalled in a landmark historical essay. Better yet, digital technology would itself become “sovereign,” “silently governing all other forms of power,” observes Bertrand Leblanc-Barbedienne, founder of the media outlet Souveraine Tech.

The Autonomists, guardians of sovereign authority (1) The “autonomist family” seeks as much strategic autonomy as performance, especially in the sovereign areas of intelligence and secrecy – like the classified ISIS network developed by the OSIIC, or the secure messaging service Tchap, developed by DINUM. However, this doctrine is not based on an absolutist logic of “isolation.” It rather favors an approach by degree, depending on the criticality of the needs.

The Ministry of the Armed Forces has thus created a network of trusted suppliers (qualified LPM, NIS1, NATO, etc.), highly specialized. This is the case for ERCOM (Thales) in cryptography, Airbus Defense & Space, and Preligens for intelligence satellites. The state ensures a preeminent place in this ecosystem, through participations, qualifications, and certifications, not hesitating to publicly show its support for certain actors (such as the secure messaging service Olvid, for example). All elements that guarantee it unfettered digital freedom of action.

However, two challenges condition this autonomy. On one hand, the recruitment and retention of high-level experts for the design of “homemade” products. On the other, the maintenance of a network of suppliers with enough scope to withstand the uncertainty of public markets and the agility necessary to remain competitive in a perpetually moving sector.

The Centralizing Colbertists (2) Inspired by regalian autonomism, the colbertists wish to expand the Made in France to all aspects of digital technology through active support from public authorities. The task is not easy after a series of more or less resounding failures. Sometimes launched as European projects, Colbertist initiatives have ultimately stumbled over an impossible Franco-German cooperation and have become Franco-French failures, like the search engines Quaero (yet presented as a future “European Airbus” by Jacques Chirac), and Qwant, which have not, in any case, equaled Google.

Before them, the Plan Calcul, the nationalization of Bull, or the “nanonetwork” of the “Computer Plan For All” did not suffice to support the French microcomputer sector. Jean-Pierre Brulé will summarize the failure of these public policies by evoking an IT sector “sick from the State,” trapped in crony capitalism and a preference for major actors.

Bernard Benhamou, founder in 2017 of the Institute of Sovereignty, regrets that some French senior civil servants, fierce proponents of a centralized network, “have never gotten over the end of the Minitel in the 2000s.” A failure assessment partly shared by Pierre-Alexis de Vauplane, partner at Ring Capital, who retains, however, the undeniable success of the Public Investment Bank (BPI) in supporting French Tech.

In 2012, it was the cloud computing projects carried by two cooperations, between Orange and Thalès on one hand (Andromeda) and between SFR and Bull on the other (Numergy), which were financed by a state eager to “restore France’s digital sovereignty.” “More than two years after the birth of these future flagships, the assessment is not very glorious,” judged Delphine Cuny in La Tribune. Fortunately, the centralizing Colbertists are not the only defenders of Made in France.

The Corsairs, or the Offensive Made in France (3) The family of “corsairs” groups all those who count less on public procurement than on their own genius to conquer international markets and bring about a lasting French Tech. They suffer, however, from a shortage of capital within the European market: “Europe invests six times less than the United States in Venture Capital,” laments Pierre-Alexis de Vauplane, in his essay on digital technology.

Nevertheless, France, with twenty “unicorns” in the digital sector, can pride itself on counting very great successes, such as BlaBlaCar, Doctolib, or Voodoo. A list that should expand with the numerous French “gems” that have emerged in the sectors of cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, or quantum technology. The “corsairs” rejoice that the “strategic state,” having learned from its failures, has refocused on supporting entrepreneurship, which is bearing fruit today.

However, the corsairs do not only want to see the emergence of unicorns, which are by definition exceptional, but also what the entrepreneur Romain de Lacoste, co-founder of the startup Commines, describes as “bicornes”: small and medium-sized enterprises of human scale and high added value, which make up the majority of the French economic fabric.

Denis Yrieix ,  2024 April 30th
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